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We posit in the paper that getting out of Dutch disease or resource curse in Nigeria will 
be a mirage if the more potent disease of institutional decay, ethnicity and religious 
bigotry are not settled. Those who have opportunity to advice the country has over the 
years wrongly fixated on the rise or fall of GDP and foreign investment flows as  
attention is now centered on extraction industry. We recognize institutional factors as 
major determinants of growth in Nigeria. From our analysis it is observed that Nigeria 
has indeed fallen into the trap of Dutch disease and resource curse phenomenon. We 
also observe that Nigeria is ethnic bias and highly religious in virtually everything. And 
every policy of the government (economic, social or political) is weighed on the scale of 
religion or ethnic benefit. It is equally sad to note the quantum of resources engaged to 
curtail ethnic clashes as well deaths and IDPs. As Nigeria is governed by ethnic 
sentiments and religious bigotry , it increases the tendency for corruption and its 
attendant negative economic consequences. These constitute serious impediments and 
make the task of growth Sisyphean.  
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Nigeria, a multi-ethnic country of about 180 million people is in dire need to 
grow. Feeding the teaming population and giving hope of sustenance to this people 
largely depends on its growth trajectory and a clear understanding of the country’s 
historical antecedents. We know economic growth may not necessarily account for 
development, yet the reality is that the material conditions of a people may not change 
for better in the absence of economic growth (Anochiwa and Maduka, 2014). The world 
is fast embracing institutional factors and gradually ‘delinking’ from the orthodox 
theories of (Solow, 1956; Chenery, Hollis and Strout, 1966; Harrod, 1939; Domar, 
1946) in seeking for explanations for the backwardness of the less developed countries 
(LDCs). The idea that LDCs might suffer negative economic effects from over 
dependence on modernization theories has a long pedigree. 
Even as attention is shifting towards the new growth models and its incorporation 
of human capital (Romer, 1993, Barro et al 1995), it is still not enough to account for 
the growth disparity. Models of growth must  contextually, be situated. No growth 
model can operate in isolation of the environment. There is therefore a compelling need, 
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perhaps due to its peculiar nature to go back to a political economy (historical science) 
approach in ascertaining determinants of growth in some LDCs, especially  Nigeria 
(Jevons, 1879; Ordeshook, 1990). 
That Nigeria has abundant oil resources is no longer debatable, as she ranks 
among the highest oil producing countries in Africa. Again, that oil is the mainstay of 
the economy of Nigeria is also a reality, a reality that gained prominence since Nigeria’s 
independence in 1960. It is this prominence and dependence on oil over and above other 
sources of revenue and the necessary fall-outs, that made her gain a place in the ‘Dutch 
disease syndrome’. Curbing the disease as it were to make Nigeria grow, has excavated 
similar ‘diseases’ like ‘resource curse’ and the deep rooted ethno-religious divide, such 
that it has become more complicated and intractable in solving. Regrettably, Nigeria is 
among the poorest economies in the world even when she is ranked the largest economy 
in Africa, which is a paradox of economic growth hypothesis (Anochiwa and Maduka, 
2014). As the country forges ahead 57 years after independence, with up-swing and 
down-swing phenomenon in the economic front, never getting a footing to stand, one is 
being reminded of the ‘Sisyphus Odyssey’. 
While we appall the part of dishonor Nigeria has played in neglecting to learn 
lessons from mistakes of other mineral dependent countries, it will be equally revealing 
to look inwards to see other ‘potent diseases’ that has reinforced the crippling of the 
economy of Nigeria, than to constantly worship at the ‘altar of orthodox theories’ and 
latch on generalizations of Dutch disease. To this, the phenomenon ‘Dutch disease’, 
though pervasive and prevalent in Nigeria, may be too tangential when compared to 
other ‘internal diseases’ that have kept Nigeria low.  
It is these crippling and contending factors that we refer to as ‘the sons of 
Sisyphus at work’. In this paper, the sons of Sisyphus are not particularly Dutch disease 
but include, institutional factors, resource curse, ethnic and religious conflicts, which 
together act to hinder economic growth (Acemoglu et al 2005b). We shall be looking at 
the role these factors have played in frustrating the development stride of Nigeria. As a 
way of methodology, we shall explain the Sisyphus phenomenon, as we consider the 
role of Dutch disease to Nigeria’s economic woes, resource curse and economic growth, 
economic growth and ethnicity, the role of religion to economic growth and finally 
economic growth in Nigeria beyond rhetoric’s.  
 
NIGERIA’S ECONOMIC GROWTH AS SISYPHUS ODYSSEY 
In Greek mythology Sisyphus was the son of a King named Aeolus of Thessaly 
and Enarete. He was the founder and first king of Ephyra (supposedly the original name 
of Corinth). King Sisyphus promoted business and commerce but was greedy and 
double-faced. He frustrated, killed and violate people’s rights, even strangers. He took 
pleasure in the sufferings and killings because fear and docile polity. The gods finally 
threatened to make life so miserable for Sisyphus that he would wish he were dead. He 
was punished for his unashamed craftiness and deceitfulness by being forced to 
endlessly roll an immense huge boulder up a steep hill. The maddening nature of the 
punishment was reserved for King Sisyphus due to his belief that his cleverness 
surpassed that of Zeus himself. Zeus accordingly displayed his own cleverness by 
enchanting the boulder into rolling away from King Sisyphus before he reached the top, 
which ended up consigning Sisyphus to an eternity of useless and worthless efforts and 
unending frustration.  
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Looking at the dysfunctional growth pattern of Nigeria, where as one 
administration attempts to move the economy forward, then another administration 
comes in to destroy what its predecessor has built, it is easy to draw some valuable 
analogy.  In Nigeria you will vividly see all the attributes of Sisyphus- hypocrisy, 
insincerity, morbid wickedness to its citizens, iron-fisted rule and craftiness etc. 
Regrettably, most Nigerian economists are weighed down by modernization theories 
that seem to dwell on orthodox growth models and on generalization of ‘global 
economic down-turn’ “that things will get better soon”. But a good observer will notice 
that Nigeria’s economy has been running a never-ending cyclical peak /trough 
pendulum for years, and this portrays the economy as suffering from the debacle of the 
Sisyphus Odyssey. 
 
NIGERIA AND ‘DUTCH DISEASE PHENOMENON’ 
The term “Dutch Disease” was used to describe the experience of Netherlands 
after she discovered a massive natural gas field in Groningen in 1959. Incidentally and 
regrettably too, oil was discovered in large quantity in Nigeria at Oluobiri at the same 
period of time in history. The flow of oil and gas out of Dutch and the huge revenue that 
came out of it, made Netherlands to focus primarily on the new gas export. As a result, 
the Dutch currency grew at a quick rate which harmed the country’s ability to export 
other products. In other words, it eventually led to a crowding out of other traditional 
export sectors in Netherlands; in case of Nigeria, it crowded out cocoa, Palm oil, and 
other agricultural produce and even the little industrial manufacturing, leading to a 
decline in their competitiveness. Many countries that are rich in minerals has fallen prey 
to this phenomenon - Angola, Nigeria, Sudan, Congo, Gabon, Venezuela, Iraq, Iran, 
Kuwait, Zambia, and Chad etc. Notwithstanding, some countries (such as Botswana and 
Norway) have managed to use their natural endowments in ways that have benefited 
their countries (O'Neil and Patrick (2004).  
There may not be a definite pattern to ‘Dutch disease’ syndrome but a careful 
observer said  it follows this process. Firstly, a nation discovers ample natural resource 
(oil, gas, gold, platinum etc). Secondly, in a centrifugal nature eeconomic activities 
begin to flow towards this high income industry. Thirdly, skilled workers from other 
sectors are attracted to it. Fourthly, other sectors like Agriculture and manufacturing 
begins to suffer under high cost of doing business. Fifthly, other sectors also begin to 
lose competitiveness and their export will decline. Sixth, there will be an increase in 
imports and rent seeking that will lead to crowding out, high exchange rate and 
inflation. 
Various studies such as Sachs and Warner (2001), Weinthal and Luoug( 2006),  
show amazingly that Countries with great natural resources tend to grow slower than 
countries that have fewer resources. Based on their survey, GDP per capita in mineral-
rich countries increased only by 1.7% while that of mineral-poor countries increased by 
2.5-3.5% between 1960 to 1990; Gylfason (2001) also observed that from 1965 to 1998 
gross national product per capita in Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OPEC) decreased on average by 1.3 percent when per capita growth is an average of 
2.2% in the rest of the developing world. That Nigeria, despite having vast oil riches has 
the same or perhaps less gross national product than it had forty years ago is a victim of 
this phenomenon. Countries rich in minerals like Iran, Venezuela, grew at 1 per cent per 
year from 1965-1998 and Iraq and Kuwait grew at 3 per cent. What this portrays is there 
is a negative effect of oil industry dominance of any economy. 
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In figure 1 below, we have the pictorial data of oil revenue and non-oil revenue as 
drawn from CBN bulletin 2015. Whereas within the period 1966-1970 non-oil revenue 
accounted for nearly 80% of total revenue, the oil revenue was a paltry 19%. Again, 
within the period 1970-1980 the oil revenue contribution has risen and overtaken the 
non-oil sector – 61% for oil and 39% for non-oil. Between 2001-2005 oil revenue was 
almost 80% while non-oil was about 20%. By 2015 the oil revenue began to drop, 
perhaps due to the oil glut and the international fall of oil prices. Figure 2, show vividly 
that from 1980 the percentage of Oil revenue to GDP was continuously increasing while 
the non-oil revenue (Agriculture) trailed behind. This is a simple illustration of 
crowding out effect. That is, the components of oil revenue are now far greater than 
agriculture, which was the main stay of the economy at Independence in 1960. The 
implication if any is that oil industry is capital intensive and creates minimal impact on 




    
 
    
          
          
          
          
          
 
 
Figure 1. Oil and non-oil revenue as a percentage of GDP 





       
        
        
        
        
        
Figure 2. Oil and non-oil revenue as a percentage of GDP 
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NIGERIA’S ECONOMY AND ‘RESOURCE CURSE’ SYNDROME. 
Resource curse theories began to emerge in the late 1980s. Though often people 
use it interchangeably with Dutch disease, but they are not the same, though the former 
may lead to the later. The term was used by Auty Richard (1995), to explain how 
countries rich in natural resources – oil, gas, diamond, and other minerals misuse their 
wealth and remain underdeveloped. Jeffery Sachs and Andrew Warner (2001) show the 
link between natural resources abundance and poor economic growth. They argued that 
between 1965 and 1998, the oil producing countries (OPEC) gross national product per 
capita growth decreased on average by 1.3% against 2.2% growth per capita in other 
non-oil producing developing world. There is increasing evidence that because the 
primary sector remains important in low income countries, the scale of the natural 
resource rents and the socio-economic linkages that they generate affect the aims of the 
government and the development trajectory of the economy in important ways (Sachs 
and Warner 1995a and Auty 2001). Resource rich countries have a tendency to depend 
on it to run the state at the detriment of other sources of income. Evidence abound that 
per capita income growth in developing countries has been inversely related to the share 
of natural resource rents.  
Thus, their economic growth pattern is not rooted in production, but rather on 
fossil product. Resource curse has many negative effects. Nigeria has no doubt 
benefited from the extravagance and profligacy of resource curse hypothesis. Evidence 
abounds of the luxury and overindulgence of the elites of Nigeria, especially among the 
politicians. This luxury living is borne out of excess income and largess and the 
pervasive corruption found among politicians. The danger of resource curse is the 
creation of a decadent, dependent and largely consumption patterned, unproductive 
bourgeoisie. Resource curse increases inequality which even by bourgeoisie standards is 
dismal to growth. The unproductive nature of the ruling class has become a distortion in 
itself as people and energies are dissipated at non-essentials, as mobilization of the 
people for hard work is considered trivial. Regrettably, resource curse has remained 
with Nigeria since 1970 when Nigeria began to rely in the flow of abundant petrodollar. 
The situation was so bad that in the middle of 1970s, President Gowan said the only 
problem of Nigeria was how to spend its money. Resource curse has therefore deepened 
and reinforced the struggle to develop, and every effort to do so becomes futile.  Those 
who have opportunity to advice the country has over the years wrongly fixated on the 
rise or fall of GDP and foreign investment flows as  attention is now centered on 
extraction industry. The inability of economists to factor-in institutional factors in 
discussion of economic growth in Nigeria is to say the least regrettable. Thus, we 
consider this as acting out the institutional factor syndrome of the Sisyphus odyssey . 
 
NIGERIA’S ETHNIC DIVIDE AS AN OBSTACLE TO GROWTH. 
Again, as a way of introduction, we can say that amalgamation and emergence of 
modern Nigeria in 1914, was an act of British colonial convenience. It occurred mainly 
because British colonizers desired a colonial territory stretching from the arid Sahel to 
the Atlantic Coast, or else the two regions are almost diametrically different or perhaps 
opposed to each other in virtually every conceivable human adventure. The Northern 
geopolitical blocs, is largely Muslim, and generally look to the Middle East and the 
wider Muslim world for solidarity and sociopolitical expression; while  the South, an 
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ethnically diverse geopolitical region, is largely Christian, predominantly influenced by  
Western culture and education and traditional African values(Ochonu, 2014). Again, 
each of the two regions contains ethnic and religious minorities who harbor grievances 
against dominant ethnic and religious majorities and see them as oppressors. These 
differences have been a source of political acrimony and mutual suspicions between the 
two regions since colonial times and have affected growth. 
Soyinka (1997), have this to say ‘By virtue of its complex web of politically 
salient identities and history of chronic and seemingly intractable conflicts and 
instability, Nigeria can be rightly described as one of the most deeply divided states in 
Africa’. From its inception as a colonial state, Nigeria has faced a perennial crisis of 
territorial or state legitimacy, which has often challenged its efforts at national cohesion, 
democratization, stability and economic transformation. It is amazing that most 
economists in Nigeria do not seem to take this divide as a contending variable in the 
analysis of the Nigerian economy. The question we want to address is what has ethnic 
rivalry got to do with economic growth? The answer is Many. When there are profound 
ethnic divisions in the polity who are the gainers and who are the losers? 
1. The first victim is the government itself. Everybody will treat the country like an 
orphan. Virtually nobody believes in the existence of Nigeria except when you are in 
power or at its corridor. So deep were these religious and ethnic antagonisms that one 
Northern Nigerian Muslim nationalist leader declared Nigeria ‘the mistake of 1914’ 
while a prominent Southern Nigerian Christian nationalist figure called Nigeria ‘a 
mere geographic expression’ (Ochuno, 2014). 
2. Mismanagement of national resources (often called common wealth) and misrule by 
multi-ethnic and multi-religious coalitions of successive rulers since independence 
have impoverished and denied opportunities to the majority of Nigerians. 
3. Through socialization and education, these historical legacies of mistrust and hatred 
has been  genetically transmitted from one generation to another which has  become 
a vivid part of current reality of Nigeria’s dysfunctional state. 
4. It ends up creating a ‘victim mentality’ among the people (Richardson and Sen1996). 
Being a victim in the past, real or imagined, ethnic leaders seek control of state 
power not to promote industry, not to promote investment, not to promote economic 
growth or development but to ensure their ethnic group is never victimized again, to 
right past wrongs and to avenge past oppression. Thus, we hear some leaders come to 
power for ‘ethnic cleansing’. 
5. It culminates and encourages political mobilization along ethnic lines. As ethnic 
differences begin to polarize a society, the formation of militant groups becomes 
more probable. Examples of such groups include IPOB, MASSOB, AFENERE, 
NIGER DELTA LIBRATION FORCE, BOKO HARAM, AVENGERS etc. When 
militant groups become strong, the task of managing the economy - let alone 
resolving - ethnic differences is greatly complicated. 
6. Ordinarily, the conflict borne out of the dis-affections has greatly vitiated, dis-
articulated, deformed, destroyed and distorted Nigeria’s economic growth. 
Government now build synergy to fight battles and not for growth. Human and 
materials resources are wasted to fight insurgencies. It will be parochial to ignore the 
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dismal effect of ethnicity to economic growth. And Nigeria has suffered this scenario 
since her independence because that was what led to the first civil war in 1967. 
7. Running a non-inclusive government has also been at the center of corruption.This is 
bad because it is a good environment that will encourage investment and meaningful 
development, and the circle is bound to continue like the Sisyphus odyssey.  
Therefore, it will be full heady and myopic to study the determinants of growth in 
Nigeria without recourse to the historical underpinning. This short coming to our mind 
immensely contributed to the nature and character of Nigeria’s growth -  higgledy-
piggledy. 
 
RELIGION AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN NIGERIA: A SYNTHESIS. 
Religion is a prominent aspect of culture that can be a substantial factor in one’s 
quality of life. However, it is often overlooked as a potential determinant of economic 
growth. And failure to recognize it has created gaps economists are yet to fill. For 
example, of the six characteristics of modern economic growth that Kuznet, (1973) 
recognized, secularization was cited as a means of changing ideology in society over 
time and thus as an indirect cause of economic growth(Korman2015). The result is the 
restriction of the role of religion in modern economic growth theorizing. 
Nigeria’s national politics has been characterized by Christian anxieties about 
perceived Muslim’s domination of the national political space, and possibly Islamize 
national institutions and impose Islamic Sharia law on non-Muslims. And this dates 
back to colonial times. Muslims on their part have shown dislike for Western ideologies 
(Boko Haram) and have sporadically sought refuge in obscure religious reforms. Yes, 
religious reforms that rather impoverish the people. The Emir of Kano is quoted 
recently to have said that the states that first introduced sharia laws are the poorest states 
in Nigeria today, and he is right as Zamfara is the poorest state in Nigeria. As a result, 
religious rhetoric accusing members of other religious communities are making 
proposals to the government for religious reform as a solution to society’s ills. And the 
idea is beginning to gain currency among the elites and a section of the masses. 
It will be recalled that the adoption of the Sharia criminal legal system by some of 
Northern Nigerian Muslim-majority states between 2000 and 2002 was the climax of 
this new politicization of religion. Once Sharia was introduced, it only added and 
reinforced the fear, the feud, the clashes, and the conflict between Christian and Muslim 
communities. The conflict has led to unprecedented damages of life and property and 
displacement of millions of people from their homes. Almost on a weekly basis 
hundreds of souls are lost to communal conflicts arisen from religious intolerance. In 
this charged environment where religion functions as the primary idiom of political 
identity, conflicts over resources, cattle, land, and political offices have often taken on a 
religious coloration, with Muslims pitted against Christians (Ochuno, 2014).The data 
below will open our eyes to the devastating and damaging effect of religious rascality. 
With about 2,152,000 people, Nigeria is reported to have the largest population of 
persons displaced by conflict in Africa (IDMC, 2016). The internal Displaced 
Monitoring Center (IDMC) and the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) stated that the 
number of internally displaced persons in Nigeria is approximately a third of the IDPs 
in Africa and 10 percent of IDPs in the world. The IDPs in Nigeria is bigger than 
population of some countries in Africa: For example Nigeria’s IDP alone  is bigger than 
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Gabon, Gambia, Guinea, Botswana, Swaziland and Lesotho etc. This figure is based on 
an assessment conducted from November to December 2015 by the International 
Organization for Migration’s (IOM) Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) team in  207 
Local Government Areas (LGA) covering 13 States of Northern Nigeria: Abuja 
(13,481IDPs);Adamawa (136,010); Bauchi (70,078); Benue (85,393); Borno 
(1,434,149);Gombe (25,332); Kaduna (36,976); Kano (9,331); Nasarawa (37,553); 
Plateau (77,317); Taraba (50,227); Yobe (131,203); and Zamfara (44,929) (IDMC, 
2016). 
Figure 3 below shows the composition and classification of the total figure of 
internal displaced persons (IDPs), the assessment indicates that 12.6 per cent were 
displaced due to communal clashes, 2.4 per cent by natural disasters and 85 per cent as a 
result of insurgency attacks by Islamic extremist. This number of healthy people that are 
quarantined because of Boko Haram would have made their small input to the national 
income accounting. In other words they have been denied access to good life and also 
disenfranchised from contributing to the economy’s growth.  
 
Figure 3: The composition of Nigeria’s IDPs ‘inmates’. 
 
The following are some of the damaging effect of projecting religion over 
economic values.  
1. Official graft and war against corruption will never be won because politicians and 
their surrogates hide under the cleavages of religion frustrate the economy.. 
2. Organized religion has influenced laws and regulations that affect economic 
incentives; especially in taxation, establishment of some industries, in banking etc. 
Nigeria does not have a stable education policy today because of differences in the 
educational attainment of the regions and religious groups. One group may be 
forward looking while the other will be ‘slow going’. 
3. The religious bigotry has limited cross breed of ideas and idea `and ideologies in the 
country. You will find excess lecturers in Universities  South of the country and 
almost non-qualified lecturers on the other side of the divide. 
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4. The marking, the grading, and the promotion system in the tertiary institutions 
follows the same divide, they are not the same and the gaps are very wide. 
5. The Boko Haram tragedy that has caused the loss of lives and displaced innumerable 
number of people is propelled by religion. And all these are harmful to economic 
growth. 
 
TAMING THE SONS OF SISYPHUS:  BEYOND RHETORIC’S.  
Often we see over bloated recommendation that the way out of the Nigeria 
economic quagmire is diversification of economy. Over bloated because the call is not 
founded on realistic assumptions.  Just as the dictum that agriculture (in the 21st 
century) is the only way out for Nigeria to grow. But because many Nigerian 
economists are carried away by econometric  simulations, they give little or no attention 
to historical antecedents. They easily forget that the very essence of structural 
adjustment programme in 1986 was to diversify the economy. They are also ignorant or 
perhaps they have chosen to play the ‘ostrich’ that since 1986 till today, all regimes that 
have been in place in Nigeria, whether Military or civilian has risen to power on this 
platform and yet not one of these regimes has demonstrated readiness to initiate 
diversification. It is more like “no go area”. There are fundamental reasons why 
diversification cannot work now in Nigeria. For example, 
Only petroleum ( and Nigeria has enough of it) is consistently correlated with less 
democracy and more corruption, but both petroleum and other mineral resources have 
been statistically associated with civil wars (Collier et al. 2009, Besley & Persson 2011, 
Sorens 2011). Oil is more likely to spark conflict when it is found in regions that are 
poor relative to the national average (Østby et al. 2009) and populated by marginalized 
ethnic groups (Basedau & Richter 2014, Hunziker & Cederman 2012); when it is 
located in a region with a highly concentrated ethnic group (Morelli & Rohner 2014); 
and when ethnic minority entrepreneurs use it to promote collective resistance to the 
central government (Aspinall 2007). If you look at the case of Nigeria it is easy to 
discover all these indices vis-à-vis our Niger Delta region. The mismanagement of the 
petrodollar has created a veritable ground for disharmony in the polity. People have not 
been mobilized for production but consumption. 
What should be clear enough is measurement of Nigeria’s economic growth based 
on GDP, interest rate, FDI, capital formation and other macro-economic variables as 
determinants of growth may certainly amount to rhetorics. Realistically when we assess 
the causes and costs of prolonged ethnic conflict in Nigeria, one may begin to convince 
development planners that programs which significantly increase the risks of violence 
and ethnic conflict are not economically justifiable. We want to state categorically, that 
it is not economically justifiable to place one ethnic group alone to manage all economic 
ventures of a country of about 250 ethnic groups and a population of 180 million 
people. Nigeria is absolutely poor today not because it doesn’t have the human or 
material resources, but there is no cohesion and mobilization of the right people for 
development. Our assessment should alert present and aspiring national leaders to a 
harsh reality: the short term benefits from ethnically divisive political strategies do not 
justify the long term social economic and political costs. 
Therefore, a political economy approach, and dialectical process may be required 
to tame the sons of Sisyphus. As a matter of fact what Nigeria needs is a genuine, 
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sincere dialogue between and among the component ethnic groups on how to establish 
harmonious co-existence which in turn will make the governance, and investment 
environment healthy for business. Patriotism cannot be won in isolation of trust and 
mutual relationship and belief in the polity. 
 
CONCLUSION. 
Why has Nigeria’s economic problem become highly intractable? The answer to 
this question is no longer far-fetched. What means nothing to many countries of the 
world mean something in Nigeria? Take for example when the CBN approved the 
opening of an interest free Islamic Bank, the Christians opposed it with the fear that 
they (Sanusi the CBN Governor then) wants to Islamize the country. The major 
opposing tribes are always involved as well as their religion. The issue becomes worse 
when a non-liberal Moslem or Christian is in the helm of affairs. This has played out 
over the years by given Nigeria an epileptic and dysfunctional growth pattern 56 years 
after independence and there is no end in sight as to the best way to fix it. The best 
economist from IMT or Harvard University will fail to move Nigeria forward if he does 
not take recourse to Nigeria’s history. We say the ethnic divide and the religious bigotry 
has been entrenched in the psych of the people to the point that people are not mobilized 
for economic development but for war. Mutual suspicion has determined the way 
business of the economy is run; therefore meaningful development cannot take place 
here. So apart from the obvious Dutch disease syndrome, these other diseases(sons of 
Sisyphus) are perhaps more potent as a tool to destroy and destabilize the economy. The 
need to address them is urgent and it is now. 
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